Antitrust as Speech Control by Greene, Hillary & Yao, Dennis A.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 60 | Issue 4 Article 5
Antitrust as Speech Control
Hillary Greene
Dennis A. Yao
Copyright c 2019 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Hillary Greene and Dennis A. Yao, Antitrust as Speech Control, 60 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1215 (2019),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol60/iss4/5
ANTITRUST AS SPEECH CONTROL
HILLARY GREENE* & DENNIS A. YAO**
ABSTRACT
Antitrust law, at times, dictates who, when, and about what people
can and cannot speak. It would seem then that the First Amendment
might have something to say about those constraints. And it does,
though perhaps less directly and to a lesser degree than one might
expect. This Article examines the interface between those regimes
while recasting antitrust thinking in terms of speech control.
Our review of the antitrust-First Amendment legal landscape
focuses on the role of speech control. It reveals that while First
Amendment issues are explicitly addressed relatively infrequently
within antitrust decisions that is, in part, because certain speech (for
example, speech that promotes economic efficiency) receives indirect
protection as a byproduct of antitrust law. The potential challenges
associated with indirect, rather than direct, protection of such speech
are then explored. Significantly, such de facto protection does not,
however, extend to speech furthering noneconomic values. We then
consider some of the pros and cons associated with extending
protection to nonefficiency speech values.
Central to society’s improved treatment of such speech within
antitrust settings is a willingness to recognize the pitfalls of the
status quo, to undertake incremental change and to consciously
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cultivate learning. Perhaps the reality that such interface issues are
only likely to worsen given the ever-growing and evolving informa-
tion economy will get society talking.
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INTRODUCTION
Antitrust law, at times, dictates who, when, and about what
people can and cannot speak. It would seem then that the First
Amendment might have something to say about those constraints.
And it does, though less than one might expect.1 The interface
between these two areas of law2 is the subject of this Article.
Navigating the interface of First Amendment and antitrust law
has always been challenging3 and, we argue, is potentially becoming
more so. The Supreme Court has couched antitrust in terms of con-
stitutional qualities, such as when it characterized the Sherman Act
as the “Magna Carta of free enterprise.”4 The Court has also
employed economics-based metaphors in the First Amendment
context, such as when it describes the “marketplace of ideas.”5 The
two legal regimes are, nonetheless, rooted in different—and incom-
mensurate—systems. This central tension appears throughout
precedents that address the interface and has led to the spheres-of-
influence solution.6
This Article examines these issues by recasting antitrust think-
ing in terms of speech control. Speech facilitates a substantial por-
tion of conduct that runs afoul of antitrust laws and sometimes
constitutes the objectionable conduct itself.7 Standard analyses of
1. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Explo-
ration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004). Schauer observes that,
Little case law, and not much more commentary explain why the content-based
restrictions of speech in the Securities Act of 1933, Sherman Antitrust Act, the
National Labor Relations Act, the Uniform Commercial Code, the law of fraud
… and countless other areas of statutory and common law do not, at the least,
present serious First Amendment issues.
Id. at 1768. In this more theoretical piece, Schauer concludes that the explanation is “an often
serendipitous array of political, cultural, and economic factors determining what makes the
First Amendment salient in some instances of speech regulation but not in others.” Id. at
1765.
2. See generally Stanley D. Robinson, Reconciling Antitrust and the First Amendment,
48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1335 (1979).
3. See id. at 1335-36.
4. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (“Antitrust laws in general,
and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.”).
5. 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2:4 at 2-5 (2018).
6. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 27-28.
7. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 11-14.
2019] ANTITRUST AS SPEECH CONTROL 1219
the antitrust-First Amendment interface usually focus on whether
the speech of concern is political speech.8 Such analyses do not ex-
amine speech in the context of what seem to be garden-variety
antitrust cases. Surveying the broader antitrust landscape with a
speech lens, as we do in Part I of this article, allows for that.
Most of antitrust law can be swept into this speech control
framework given the strong role of communications in the negotia-
tion and consummation of commercial agreements as well as in
mergers and in monopolization conduct that involves communica-
tions.9 Understanding the role of speech in these varied contexts
allows one to identify if speech values are directly or indirectly
present and, if so, how well they are protected. Furthermore, the
analysis highlights the problems posed in complex settings involving
“hybrid” speech that has both economic efficiency and nonefficiency
impacts.10
Part II of the article argues that speech is protected indirectly as
a byproduct of antitrust law. Such de facto protection extends to
speech that enhances economic efficiency, the core concern of
antitrust law, but not to speech furthering noneconomic values. The
failure of antitrust thinking to deal forthrightly with speech rights
is an increasing concern in an era when information-based activities
constitute a critical and growing part of our economy.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT AND ANTITRUST LANDSCAPE
Speech is any communication from one party to at least one other
party. Its relevance to antitrust law is pervasive as it is used to
come to agreements (for example, negotiations to reach an explicit
price fixing agreement),11 facilitate agreements (for example, in-
formation about sales that allow firms to monitor possible devi-
ations from a price agreement),12 and interpret actions (for example,
explanation for a capacity decrease). Sometimes speech itself is the
anticompetitive conduct (for example, an expressive boycott).13
8. See generally infra Part I.A.
9. See generally infra Part I.C.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 255-57.
11. See generally infra text accompanying notes 75-78.
12. See, e.g., infra note 100 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text (characterizing the boycott in FTC
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Generally, speech is problematic for antitrust purposes when it is
part of a pattern of action and communication that together reduces
market competition.14
There are a number of ways to conceptualize the value of free
speech to society. We divide the value in terms of speech as a
“means to an end” and as an “end in itself” as described by Smolla
and Nimmer, which roughly follows the marketplace and the human
dignity/self-fulfillment theories justifying free speech.15 While the
emphasis of the marketplace theory is based on supporting the
process of discourse and its value to society, the human dignity
theory concerns the value of self-expression without regard to the
value to society.16 As Justice Thurgood Marshall observed, “The
First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also
those of the human spirit—a spirit that demands self-expression.”17
This article focuses on the two forms of utilitarian value.
We adapt these values to the antitrust context by expanding the
means to an end value into a utilitarian value which consists of the
social utility associated with contributing to improved economic
efficiency in the marketplace and the social utility associated with
contributing to nonefficiency purposes including augmenting the
“marketplace of ideas” which impacts political, social, and economic
decisions and understandings.18 This division mirrors the approach
v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association as “expressive”).
14. See Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 213 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that frequent
meetings during which defendants discussed compensation information constitutes a factor
suggesting an anticompetitive information exchange); see also United States v. Utah Soc’y for
Healthcare Human Res. Admin., No. 94C282G, 1994 WL 729931, at *2 (D. Utah Sept. 14,
1994) (alleging the conspiracy to restrain nurse’s wages unfolded through a series of telephone
calls, information surveys, and HR association meetings).
15. SMOLLA, supra note 5, § 2:21. For instant purposes, we include the ability of speech
to contribute to democratic self-governance under the marketplace for ideas justification, as
both concern social utility. Despite the value of these distinctions for instant purposes, these
theories are not “mutually exclusive” but, instead, can be understood as “mutually supportive
rationales” that favor “elevated protection for freedom of speech.” Id. at § 2:7.
16. “Free speech is thus especially valuable for reasons that have nothing to do with the
collective search for truth or the processes of self-government, or for any other concep-
tualization of the common good.” Id. § 2:21. For example, “people who have freedom to develop
their own unique lives will make better democratic citizens.” DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 9 (West Acad., 4th ed. 2014).
17. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974), rev’d on other grounds, 490 U.S. 401
(1989).
18. See SMOLLA, supra note 5, § 2:4 at 2-4.1, 2-5.
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antitrust analysis takes in recognizing economic efficiency that
results from the actions in question while not recognizing non-
efficiency impacts.19 While this distinction is often blurred it
remains valuable for understanding the interface of antitrust law
and speech rights.
In antitrust cases involving speech rights, First Amendment
issues tend to form bookends of sorts. First, there may be consider-
ation of whether the speech or expressive conduct in question
warrants immunity based on the First Amendment.20 When, as is
generally the case, there is no immunity,21 First Amendment issues
occasionally reappear to potentially limit remedies that unduly con-
strain speech.22 Sandwiched in between is the standard antitrust
liability analysis that is typically devoid of overt speech consider-
ations.23 We examine the bookends, then return to the liability
analysis.
A. Immunity
Immunity refers to “[a]ny exemption for a duty [or] liability.”24
In this context, immunity refers to protection from antitrust liabili-
ty under the First Amendment. If the speech or expressive con-
duct at issue (hereinafter “speech”) being challenged on antitrust
grounds receives First Amendment immunity, then the matter is
19. See, e.g., infra Part I.C.9.
20. See infra Part I.A.
21. See infra Part I.A.
22. See infra Part I.B.
23. We know of only two cases that address arguments that conventional legal standards
should be modified owing to the presence of First Amendment rights. In Levitch v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 649, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the defendant sought to
increase the pleading requirements—rather than seek immunity—owing to the presence of
First Amendment rights. Despite some engagement by the court, it ultimately granted a
motion to dismiss to the plaintiff based on traditional pleading standards. Id. For further
discussion of Levitch, see generally Hillary Greene, Muzzling Antitrust: Information Products,
Innovation and Free Speech, 95 B.U. L. REV. 35, 97-99 (2015). The other case is the D.C.
Circuit court ruling in Superior Court Trial Lawyers v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
rev’d, 493 U.S. 411 (1990), in which that court advocated applying the antitrust rule of reason,
rather than per se treatment, owing to the presence of speech interest. Id. This position was
supported by the concurring Justices before the Supreme Court. See FTC v. Superior Court
Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 439-40 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
24. Immunity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
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dismissed.25 Two factors are worth noting. First, the Constitutional
challenges within this context do not question the legitimacy of the
antitrust laws generally but rather their application to specific
facts.26 Second, the speech at issue is ultimately subject to binary
treatment.27 Either the speech at issue receives First Amendment
protection and is immunized from antitrust enforcement, or it is
subject to the full force of the antitrust laws. There is no middle
ground.28
In antitrust law, the most straightforward application of the First
Amendment is protection of direct petitioning of government (for
example, lobbying).29 The political character of the speech is self-
evident, based on the existence of a government entity to which the
communication is directed, and results in immunization.30
Somewhat more challenging issues have arisen regarding
boycotts in which the underlying refusal to deal with another party
is meant to prompt the government to adopt a particular policy. In
Missouri v. National Organization for Women, the National Orga-
nization for Women (NOW) organized a boycott of the convention-
based industry in Missouri to pressure the state to approve the
Equal Rights Amendment.31 NOW’s action was described as “a
politically motivated but economically tooled boycott participated in
and organized by noncompetitors of those who suffered as a result
of the boycott.”32 Though the Eighth Circuit’s ultimate decision
upholding immunity for the defendants was focused narrowly on the
right to petition, the court’s decision emphasized that the legislation
at issue was not economic legislation, and that the boycotters were
25. See, e.g., Missouri v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980).
26. See, e.g., id. (holding that the scope of the Sherman Act did not cover the speech at
issue).
27. See, e.g., id. (applying the First Amendment to the facts).
28. See Greene, Muzzling Antitrust, supra note 23, at 39.
29. See, e.g., United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); E. R.R.
Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961) (holding that
petitioning the government, even for anticompetitive purposes, warrants First Amendment
protection and is therefore immunized from antitrust action). The Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
which is self-evidently grounded in the First Amendment, is beyond the scope of this Article
which focuses on the under or unappreciated speech interests. See id.
30. See Greene, Muzzling Antitrust, supra note 23, at 39.
31. Nat’l Org. for Women, 620 F.2d at 1302-03.
32. Id. at 1302.
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not businesses focused on increased profits.33 This characteristic is
important because categorizing the speech at issue as political has,
in effect, been deemed essential for immunity and because that
designation has been increasingly defined in terms of communica-
tions in which the speaker has no economic interest.34
The binary treatment of constitutional defenses to antitrust
challenges provides a simple rule to support difficult judicial de-
cisions: is the speech at issue protected and, therefore, immunized
from antitrust scrutiny?35 One advantage of a binary or spheres-of-
influence treatment is that it avoids tradeoffs by treating constitu-
tional rights (for example, speech) as trumping the nonconstitution-
al values of antitrust law. A disadvantage is that it is, alone, a blunt
instrument for protecting speech values.
B. Remedies
Significantly, just because no First Amendment issues arose or
were credited up through the point when antitrust liability is found,
does not mean that speech-related considerations do not shape
antitrust law.36 First Amendment-based protection may emerge to
prevent unconstitutional restrictions on speech that are a part of the
remedy for illegal conduct. Assuming a finding of antitrust liability,
if the remedy to the anticompetitive conduct involves a restriction
on speech, this restriction must be sufficiently tailored to meet the
appropriate level of scrutiny.37
The least stringent level of scrutiny given to government action,
is a “highly deferential” standard that requires the government
restraint at issue to “bear[ ] a rational relation to [some legitimate]
33. See id. at 1311-12, 1319.
34. Hillary Greene, Antitrust Censorship of Economic Protest, 59 DUKE L.J. 1037, 1046
(2010) (“More specifically, the Court has held that a nonexhaustive list of topics for which
expression would be entitled to ‘full First Amendment protection’ includes ‘philosophical,
social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters.’ Protected speech need not be political
either in content or in context (namely, government petitioning).” (quoting Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977))). The importance of economic interest is further
discussed in the Boycott discussion below. See infra Part I.C.8.
35. See Greene, Muzzling Antitrust, supra note 23, at 39.
36. See Greene, supra note 34, at 1046 (quoting McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485
(1985)).
37. See id.
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end.”38 Intermediate scrutiny, as applied in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, requires
that a “restriction of speech must serve ‘a substantial interest,’ and
it must be ‘narrowly drawn.’”39 Most importantly for these purposes,
this is the standard that applies to commercial speech with the
caveat that “[f]or commercial speech to come within that provision,
it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.”40
Finally, “‘[s]trict scrutiny’ is the highest and most demanding level
of review in constitutional law. It is traditionally articulated as
requiring a ‘compelling governmental interest’ and demanding that
the law be ‘precisely tailored’ or the ‘least restrictive means’ to
effectuate that interest.”41
Two cases that illustrate how First Amendment considerations
may affect the remedies phase of an antitrust action are United
States v. National Society of Professional Engineers42 and ES
Development v. RWM Enterprises, Inc.43 In the late 1970s, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) challenged the National Society of
Professional Engineers’ Code of Ethics, which contained a provision
“prohibit[ing] any form of competitive bidding on engineering
projects.”44 The Society’s effort to enforce that prohibition prompted
an antitrust suit by DOJ claiming a Section 1 violation.45 The D.C.
District Court found against the Society and enjoined it from
adopting any “future expression that the price practice [bidding]
is unethical,” and required it to “publish an advice that its prior
ruling has been rescinded.”46 It also ordered “the Society to state
38. SMOLLA, supra note 5, § 3:2 at 3-7 n.4 (quoting JOHN NOWAK & RONALD ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3 (4th ed. 1991)).
39. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1980)).
40. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
41. SMOLLA, supra note 5, § 2.5 at 2-88.5.
42. 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff ’d, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
43. 939 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1097 (1992).
44. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs, 555 F.2d at 979.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 984; see id. at 980. (“The district court then entered judgment enjoining the
defendant from adopting any rule or policy statement which in any way prohibits or
discourages the submission of price quotations or states or implies the price competition is
unethical and further ordered the defendant ‘to state in any publication of its Code of Ethics
that the submission of price quotations for engineering services at any time and in any
amount is not considered an unethical practice.’”).
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affirmatively that it does not consider competitive bidding to be
unethical.”47 The D.C. Circuit Court affirmed the first two remedial
measures, but declared that compelling speech by the Society “en-
croach[ed] on that sphere of free thought and expression protected
by the First Amendment.”48 Its rationale was that “[a]ny such
regulation by the state should not be more intrusive than necessary
to achieve fulfillment of the governmental interest [regarding
antitrust].”49
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed both the finding of lia-
bility and the remedy as modified by the circuit court.50 The Court’s
only discussion of the level of scrutiny applied is the statement of
their inquiry, “whether the relief represents a reasonable method
of eliminating the consequences of the illegal conduct.”51 The Court
concluded it did, notwithstanding the fact that the injunction “goes
beyond a simple proscription against the precise conduct previously
pursued.”52 With regard to the Society’s fears that the injunction “if
broadly read, will block legitimate paths of expression on all ethical
matters relating to bidding,” the Court felt that, “[i]f the Society
wishes to adopt some other ethical guideline more closely confined
to the legitimate objective of preventing deceptively low bids, it
may move the district court for modification of the decree.”53
Chief Justice Burger dissented from “that portion of the judgment
prohibiting petitioner from stating in its published standards of
ethics the view that competitive bidding is unethical.... The First
Amendment guarantees the right to express such a position and
that right cannot be impaired under the cloak of remedial judicial
action.”54
47. Id. at 984 (describing the district court’s decree).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 681 (1978).
51. Id. at 698 (emphasis added). National Society of Professional Engineers predates
Central Hudson, where the intermediate scrutiny standard for commercial speech was estab-
lished. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564-
65 (1980).
52. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 698 (quoting United States v. Nat’l Soc’y of
Prof’l Eng’rs, 555 F.2d 978, 983 (1977)).
53. Id. at 698-99.
54. Id. at 701 (Burger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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In ES Development, Inc. v. RWM Enterprises, Inc., the district
court found that the defendants, automobile franchisees, conspired
to prevent development of an auto mall proposed by ES Develop-
ment.55 The proposed mall would have “operate[d] in the manner of
a condominium complex.”56 The claim was that the franchisees did
not want their respective car manufacturers to establish new fran-
chises in the mall because the competition, as well as the conve-
nience of one-stop shopping more generally, would hurt their own
sales.57 Towards that end, eight local franchisees formed a “Dealer’s
Alliance” which, among other things, jointly hired an attorney who
drafted generic letters which each of the franchise members then
sent to their respective manufacturers.58 The franchisees were all
entitled to voice their concerns to their respective manufacturers re-
garding the award of any same-line franchise within their respective
territories.59 However, the manner in which they jointly undertook
this effort was condemned under the antitrust laws.60 The district
court rejected the defendants’ First Amendment defense.61
The injunction prohibited the defendants from individual, joint,
or coordinated activity regarding the proposed auto mall.62 They
were also enjoined from “communicating with or responding to
communications from any automobile franchisor or manufacturer”
regarding the auto mall.63 Defendant RWM Enterprises argued on
appeal that these provisions were “overbroad in that they prohibit
them from exercising their constitutionally protected rights of
commercial speech.”64
The Eighth Circuit upheld the finding of antitrust liability and
recognized the district court’s “authority to impose certain restric-
tions upon the commercial speech of individual entities which have
55. No. 89-1867-C-5, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17706, at *16 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 27, 1989).
56. ES Dev., Inc. v. RWM Enters., Inc., 939 F.2d 547, 550 (8th Cir. 1991).
57. Id. at 551.
58. Id. at 551-52.
59. See ES Dev., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17706, at *18-20.
60. See id. at *16.
61. See ES Dev., 939 F.2d at 556.
62. ES Dev., Inc. v. RWM Enters., Inc., No. 89-1867-C-5, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17705,
at *1 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 27, 1989) (order granting preliminary injunction).
63. Id.
64. ES Dev., 939 F.2d at 557.
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violated the Sherman Act.”65 The circuit court, relying on Central
Hudson, found, however, that the “failure to limit the duration of its
[remedial] restraint against appellants’ individual exercise of com-
mercial speech renders the relief overbroad, particularly in light of
its constitutional ramifications.”66 Limitations upon such commu-
nications were necessary to prevent the appellants from continuing
to benefit from and from continuing such conduct,67 although, “the
continuing effects of the conspiracy are certain to recede with
time.”68 Upon remanding to the district court, the circuit court ob-
served that those defendants who settled with the plaintiff “agreed
not to oppose the development of the Mall for a period of two
years.”69 Without any explanation, the circuit court “suggest[ed]”
that the “limitation probably ought not to exceed three years.”70
The rarity with which First Amendment challenges to antitrust
remedies arise within judicial opinions is notable given the extent
to which communication and information restriction remedies ap-
pear in cases. The lack of such challenges could be because the
typical speech remedies applied already roughly meet the Central
Hudson tests,71 or courts may avoid First Amendment challenges by
choosing second-best remedies that do not involve speech. It is also
possible that some courts may anticipate that the potentially of-
fending conduct lacks a remedy that would pass First Amendment
muster and hence choose not to find liability.72
C. Liability
This Section explores the role of speech and its protection with-
in the liability phase of an antitrust proceeding. Our survey of
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 558.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 558-59.
70. Id. at 559.
71. See supra Part I.B.
72. If so, this raises problems regarding the transparency of the process and the candor
of the courts. First Amendment issues may be considered earlier in a legal proceeding. For ex-
ample, even at the early stages of a proceeding (that is, motions to dismiss or for summary
judgment) courts may openly wonder what remedies might be available given First Amend-
ment constraints.
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antitrust conduct is selective rather than exhaustive. For many
causes of action the role of speech is straightforward. Considering
several such actions is, nonetheless, instructive because it sharpens
our understanding of more complex settings. We begin our survey
of the legal landscape of antitrust with matters involving concerted
action, which include horizontal agreements (for example, collusion,
information sharing, boycotts, and vertical price-fixing) and follow
with a discussion of unilateral actions that involve speech (for
example, disparaging speech about a competitor’s product and
predatory design of information products where the product itself is
speech). We particularly focus on antitrust violations that more
directly raise speech issues. This vantage point provides us a per-
spective on the relationship between speech rights and antitrust
law.
In what follows we briefly describe the conduct at issue, what
speech is involved, and how it may contribute to both anticompeti-
tive and procompetitive effects. Where relevant, we also consider
whether any values beyond economic efficiency might be implicated
by the conduct in question and the relationship between the
efficiency and nonefficiency content of speech.
1. Collusion
A central rationale for antitrust law is to prevent collusion among
firms to raise prices.73 Prices are the “central nervous system of the
economy” and the diminution of competition between horizontal
competitors through direct price fixing is particularly pernicious.74
As such, an agreement to fix price is deemed per se illegal under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, meaning that the agreement is
presumptively illegal regardless of whether any actual competitive
harm has or is likely to result from the conduct at issue.75 The
manner in which this illegal activity is defined is based on conduct,76
73. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927).
74. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940).
75. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. at 397-400. Market division, a closely related collusive
activity, also receives per se treatment. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46,
49-50 (1990).
76. See, e.g., Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. at 397-400 (discussing price fixing agreement
without reference to the “speech” involved).
2019] ANTITRUST AS SPEECH CONTROL 1229
but the agreement is negotiated through speech. Furthermore,
speech can be critical for maintaining collusion by supporting
monitoring of actions that might otherwise be seen as defections and
for adjusting the agreement.
Antitrust laws against price fixing have been periodically, albeit
unsuccessfully, challenged on First Amendment grounds.77 It is
unsurprising that such a defense is handily rejected given that
speech is being used strictly as a means to an illegal end. Most
importantly for instant purposes, the fact that speech facilitates the
activity, price fixing, does not operate to insulate price fixing from
the application of the antitrust laws.78
It is useful to consider why this example engenders no First
Amendment defense. What does it mean for speech to be just a
means to facilitate the agreement? In terms of content, the speech
is directed solely to the agreement itself: an agreement condemned
under both the civil and criminal antitrust actions.79 Stated al-
ternatively, the speech is de minimis and is subordinated to the
conduct, and is without any other redeeming purpose. There is no
meaning to the speech beyond its facilitation of the collusive agree-
ment. This is suggested, in part, because the sole audience is the
colluding parties. It is private, not public, and the content of the
speech is presumably limited to narrow marketplace concerns. For
all these reasons, there is no tradeoff between protecting antitrust
values and First Amendment values.
2. Invitation to Collude
An interesting variant to classic collusion cases are matters the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has brought under a per se invi-
tation-to-collude theory.80 Relying on the Commission’s Section 5
77. See, e.g., Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 814 F.2d 358, 376
(7th Cir. 1987).
78. See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 431 (1990) (“The most
blatant, naked price-fixing agreement is a product of communication, but that is surely not
a reason for viewing it with special solicitude.”).
79. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
80. Although the FTC has a litigation stance that invitations to collude are per se illegal,
their selection of cases takes into account factors that reflect rule of reason thinking; for
example, they take into account other factors such as business justifications for the
communications at issue. See Larry Fullerton, FTC Challenges to “Invitations to Collude,” 25
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authority, the FTC has prosecuted one party for allegedly inviting
another party to collude even if the solicited party declines.81
Because no agreement is reached, there is no actual collusion. Some
obvious distinctions between collusion and invitations to collude are
apparent. Most important are the differing tradeoffs. Because
collusion has not occurred, the actual harm is certainly less than
with actual collusion. Prohibiting such invitations is meant to deter
attempts to collude, thereby presumably reducing collusion.
Deterrence is particularly important given the difficulty of discover-
ing actual collusion.
As with collusion, speech is subordinated to the illegal act. Under
the invitation-to-collude theory, there was a unilateral effort, albeit
unsuccessful, to collude, and speech in the form of an invitation was
the alleged illegal act.82 How can or should these different circum-
stances influence the law? One can ask whether there are any re-
deeming purposes, potential procompetitive aspects, associated with
such speech. That might seem like a question whose merits do not
survive its utterance. Certainly, in the simple naked invitation to
collude, there is merely a failed attempt to do something illegal. But
some comparatively aggressive uses of the invitation to collude
theory, those in which the communications were public,83 for ex-
ample, have led some observers to wonder about its potential to
overreach and to question whether the associated speech might
have legitimate purposes.84 If there was no market power, why solic-
it a collusive agreement? Why would one solicit collusion in a public
forum rather than in private? Could clamping down on activities
somehow interfere with or chill meetings between competitors that
could enhance social welfare or somehow discourage public discus-
sions with investment analysts?85 In fact, some commentators argue
that, “[a] strong argument can be made under the First Amendment
ANTITRUST 30, 30, 32 (2011). Additionally, invitation to collude cases have also been brought
under an attempted monopolization claim. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Airlines, Inc. 743
F.2d 1114, 1115 (5th Cir. 1984).
81. See, e.g., Kevin J. Arquit, Developments and Trends in FTC Antitrust Enforcement, 2
ANN. ANTITRUST L. INST. 459, 461-65 (1993) (discussing cases).
82. See Fullerton, supra note 80.
83. In re Valassis Commc’ns, Inc., 141 F.T.C. 247, 249 (2006).
84. See Fullerton, supra note 80, at 33-34; see also Arquit, supra note 81, at 464.
85. Id.
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for a per se rule against sanctioning [certain types of] public speech
... under the antitrust laws.”86
3. Information Sharing Generally
As a further variation, consider information sharing activities
that raise anticompetitive concerns but do so in settings where
communications have a clearer procompetitive potential. Here,
unlike with invitations to collude, the article of faith in communi-
cations may be more easily justified. These contexts might include
private information sharing that occurs as a prelude to mergers
or is ongoing between joint venture partners. We then address
industry-wide public information sharing and the special case of
self-regulatory organizations and professional associations.
The primary antitrust concern associated with information shar-
ing is that sharing of competitively sensitive information has some-
times been implicated as a facilitating practice supporting tacit
coordination.87 Knowledge of firm-specific transaction and pricing
information or future plans could, for example, assist in the nego-
tiation of a collusive agreement or in monitoring compliance with an
existing explicit or tacit price or a quantity-fixing agreement.88 But
86. Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Governance Speech and the First
Amendment, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 163, 205 (1994). They state that “[f]rom the standpoint of
reasonable fit between regulatory ends and means, the invitation to collude theory [reflected
to select FTC proceedings], are at least highly questionable.” Id. at 203 (footnote omitted).
Additionally, they argue that the burden on the government to show need for the regulation
is not fulfilled noting that “the Court has made it clear that the First Amendment requires
the government to show more than the mere possibility of regulatory benefit to justify
commercial speech regulation.” Id. at 204; see supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text
(discussing commercial speech standards).
87. See FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COL-
LABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 6 (2000) [hereinafter Guidelines]; Plaintiff Competitive
Impact Statement at 2, United States v. Utah Soc’y for Healthcare Hum. Res. Admin., No.
94C282G (D. Utah Mar. 14, 1994) (describing the information exchanges raising antitrust
concern: “[f]rom ... 1984 ... through ... 1992 ... [there was a] conspiracy to restrain[ ] wage
competition for registered nursing services in Salt Lake County, Utah.... effectuated through
telephone calls and written surveys.... through [HR association] meetings.”).
88. See GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 15-16; see also Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev.
(OECD), Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Roundtable on Information Ex-
changes Between Competitors Under Competition Law, Note by the Delegation of the U.S.,
DAF/COMP/WD 117 at 2 (Oct. 21, 2010).
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lack of market-relevant information is also a key obstacle to efficient
resource allocation.
4. Information Sharing and Mergers
Parties to a merger may exchange private information as part of
the due diligence process leading to a potential acquisition.89 Such
information could facilitate coordination prior to the merger or
between the parties even if no merger occurs.90
In Omnicare, after noting that there is virtually no case law es-
tablishing “standards for determining when premerger discussions
are anticompetitive,”91 the district court discussed the tensions
between pro and anticompetitive effects that are involved in pre-
merger information sharing.92
The balance the court seeks to strike here is a sensitive one. On
the one hand, courts should not allow plaintiffs to pursue
Sherman Act claims merely because conversations concerning
business took place between competitors during merger talks;
such a standard could chill business activity by companies that
would merge but for a concern over potential litigation. On the
other hand, the mere possibility of a merger cannot permit
business rivals to freely exchange competitively sensitive
information. This standard could lead to ‘sham’ merger negotia-
tions, or at least allow for periods of cartel behavior when, as
here, there is a substantial period of time between the signing of
the merger agreement and the closing of the deal.93
89. See William Blumenthal, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Rhetoric of Gun-
Jumping: Remarks Before the Ass’n of Corporate Counsel (Nov. 10, 2005), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/rhetoric-gun-jumping/20051110gunjumping.
pdf [https://perma.cc/SPA8-5YU3].
90. Id.
91. Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 2d 945, 968 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
Omnicare alleged that UnitedHealth Group and PacifiCare (health insurers) shared
information during merger negotiations that was used by each to better negotiate a deal with
Omnicare (an institutional pharmacy). Id. at 948. The district court granted summary
judgment for the insurers, id. at 981, which was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit. Omnicare,
Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 699 (7th Cir. 2011).
92. See Omnicare, Inc., 594 F. Supp. at 968.
93. Id.
2019] ANTITRUST AS SPEECH CONTROL 1233
Why is there so little antitrust case law on this subject? One
explanation is that firms have incentives to protect competitively
sensitive information during the process to keep them from being
vulnerable to information trolling by rival firms. As a matter of self-
protection as well as to avoid potential antitrust issues, communica-
tions can be carefully structured in terms of what is revealed when
and to whom.94 While the content of the communications here is
competitively sensitive, limiting the listeners to the direct parties
involved and their advisors as well as meting out the information
depending on the apparent seriousness of the suitor, also increases
the difficulty of using this information in anticompetitive ways.95
5. Information Sharing, Joint Ventures, and Other
Collaborations
Joint ventures and other collaborations that involve an “effici-
ency-enhancing integration of economic activity” between firms are
analyzed under a rule of reason which balances the anticompetitive
harm of such a collaboration against its procompetitive benefits.96
Anticompetitive harms are of particular concern when the collab-
orating parties are horizontal rivals because the agreement and
subsequent interactions may be a channel through which “in-
dependent decision making” is limited or explicit or tacit collusion
is facilitated.97 Procompetitive benefits are recognized if the collab-
orative agreement is “reasonably necessary” to achieve them.98
Because ongoing communication is essential to such collaborations,
speech restrictions are typically a guard against anticompetitive
harm but they also might pose a danger of reduced efficiency
benefits.
94. See Holly Vedova et al., Avoiding Antitrust Pitfalls During Pre-Merger Negotiations
and Due Diligence, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
blogs/competition-matters/2018/03/avoiding-antitrust-pitfalls-during-pre-merger
[https://perma.cc/ZU77-3DPX].
95. See id. Another explanation could be that if collusion were to actually occur the focus
of a collusion case would be on direct evidence relating to the collusive agreement. The FTC
has challenged such premerger information sharing both in instances when it has and when
it has not challenged the underlying merger. See id.
96. GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 4.
97. See id. at 6.
98. See id. at 9.
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Private information exchanges between joint venture partners
which have the potential to facilitate collusion, but are not central
to the procompetitive purpose of the venture, may be proscribed. For
example, the 1984 NUMMI joint venture between General Motors
and Toyota to produce subcompact automobiles was subject to a
consent order that allowed exchange of “information necessary to
produce the Sprinter-derived vehicles” but proscribed the parties
from
the transfer or communication of any [nonpublic] information
concerning current or future prices of new automobiles or
component parts produced by either automaker; sales or pro-
duction forecasts or plans for any product not produced by the
Joint Venture; marketing plans for any product ... and develop-
ment and engineering activities relating to the product of the
Joint Venture.99
6. Industry-Wide Information Sharing
Firm decision making is enhanced when firms have good market
information regarding prices, quantities, costs, demand, and so
on.100 This information is commonly organized through third parties
who survey market participants and provide the industry with such
information allowing, for example, firms to benchmark their
performance against others in their industry and in the economy
more generally.101 While such information is important to the
efficient operation of markets, some types of information sharing
among firms may facilitate explicit or tacit coordination among
horizontal rivals in a manner similar to that described for collabora-
tions between firms.102
99. General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374, 374 (1984) (consent order).
100. See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Issues Related to Bench-
marking and Other Information Exchanges, Remarks Before the ABA Section of Antitrust Law
and ABA Center for Continuing Legal Education’s Teleseminar on Benchmarking and Other
Information Exchanges Among Competitors 2-3 (May 3, 2011).
101. Id. at 15-16. Within industry, information exchanges such as performance
benchmarking have the potential to raise antitrust concerns and, as a result, proposed
information exchanges have generated the most business review requests. See id. at 24.
102. See id. at 16. Trade associations have, for example, been implicated in exchanges of
competitively sensitive information that were alleged to facilitate collusion. See, e.g., In re
Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., No. C-4255, 2009 WL 1102975, at *4-5 (F.T.C. Apr. 8, 2009). For
2019] ANTITRUST AS SPEECH CONTROL 1235
As an example of the tension between the anticompetitive and
procompetitive effects associated with industry information sharing,
consider United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co.103 The Airline
Tariff Publishing Company, a joint venture of eight U.S. airlines,
created a system by which current and future pricing information
was collected and then reported to the airlines and the public.104
DOJ argued, among other things, that the airlines used future fares
as a means through which price agreements could be negotiated,
noting that the airlines frequently modified future fares in response
to changes in fares of their competitors.105 Critically, many of these
fares were not yet available for purchase.106 Thus, although the
fares were ostensibly public, DOJ argued that the unavailable fares
had limited value to anyone other than the airlines themselves.107
The consent order focused on proscribing pricing information
dissemination for which consumers could not benefit, leaving intact
the overall information sharing system which could presumably be
used in the same way as before, but at a higher cost.108 Here, be-
cause no direct communication among the firms was alleged, the
government was careful not to undermine any real consumer value
that public pricing information provides.109
Information exchanges in healthcare markets that may include
prices, costs, wages, healthcare outcomes, and effective protocols are
valuable inputs to improving the efficiency of contracting processes
and individual decision making.110 To delineate some safe practices
a discussion of concerns and issues involving the possible anticompetitive effects associated
with benchmarking of compensation, see Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir.
2001). Information exchanges, for example, regarding cyber threats involve information that
is “very technical in nature” and “very different” than “competitively sensitive information
such as current or future prices and output or business plans” and hence is unlikely “to raise
antitrust concerns.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST POLICY STATE-
MENT ON SHARING OF CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION 3-4, 7 (2014).
103. 836 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1993).
104. Id. at 10.
105. See Complaint at 5-8, United States v. Airline Tariff Publ’g Co., 836 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C.
1993) (No. 92-2854).
106. See id. at 7.
107. See id. at 6-8.
108. Airline Tariff Publ’g Co., 836 F. Supp. at 10-14.
109. See id. at 12.
110. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENT OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE 49 (Aug. 1996).
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that could help avoid information exchanges being used “by
competing providers for discussion of coordination of provider prices
and costs,” DOJ and FTC issued healthcare antitrust guidelines; the
guidelines suggest information collection be managed by a third
party, the information should not be current (specifically, it should
be more than three months old), and it should be aggregated to
avoid revealing connections between particular prices and costs and
individual providers.111
For antitrust purposes, the content of that communication be-
comes more worrisome as the information involves future as op-
posed to historical information, and is disaggregated (for example,
more easily identified to particular firms) rather than aggregated.112
Depending on time lags, historical information may facilitate mon-
itoring of coordinated behavior. “Future” potential price informa-
tion, the focus of the Airline Tariff Publishing Co. case,113 could be
seen as moving the role of communication beyond mere facilitation
of a tacit coordination scheme to one of facilitating the negotiation
about the terms of the coordination.
7. Self-Regulatory Initiatives and Professional Organizations
In many sectors of the economy, industry-based or nonprofit
organizations impose some guidance or limitations on the competi-
tors’ activities. For example, financial accounting standards are
created by the Financial Accounting Services Board which operates
111. Id. at 45; see also United States v. Utah Soc’y for Healthcare Hum. Res. Admin., No.
94-C-282G, 1994 WL 750648, at *4 (D. Utah Sept. 9, 1994) (consent agreement) (restricting
among other things exchanging current or perspective information regarding wages of nurses
with specific comments on what communication is not prohibited). Along these lines, the
enforcement agencies note that sharing information regarding employment conditions
represents an antitrust risk, noting “a buyer may need to obtain limited competitively
sensitive information” and suggesting the importance of taking “appropriate precautions.”
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE
PROFESSIONALS 5 (Oct. 2016).
112. See GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 15-16 (“[O]ther things being equal, the sharing of
information ... on current operating and future business plans is more likely to raise concerns
than the sharing of historical information.... [O]ther things being equal, the sharing of
individual company data is more likely to raise concern than the sharing of aggregated data
that does not permit recipients to identify individual firm data.”).
113. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
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independently from the government,114 while other organizations
create technical standards. State bar associations create and
administer minimum quality standards needed to practice law in a
given state, and some organizations such as the NCAA impose rules
on its members relating to amateurism in sports.115 These self-
regulatory organizations negotiate and publicize guidelines or rules
governing their members, oftentimes promoting purposes that
arguably extend beyond the self-interest of their membership.116
While the welfare-enhancing aspects of self-regulation are clear,
so too is the potential for self-regulation to shape competition in pos-
sibly anticompetitive ways. A number of professional association
rules have been challenged as anticompetitive.117 These include
restrictions on speech such as price advertising in the case of var-
ious professions including optometry118 and dentistry,119 and policies
suggesting acceptable standard setting processes.120 First Amend-
ment issues have also directly surfaced in this context, especially
regarding professional norms which have been defended, albeit fre-
quently without success, on speech grounds (for example, American
Medical Association and National Society of Professional Engi-
neers).121
In summary, antitrust law and policy regarding information
sharing broadly defined, by regulating what can and cannot be
communicated either privately or publicly, can be viewed as anti-
trust control of speech. We see this most directly in the remedies to
114. See generally KARTHIK RAMANNA, POLITICAL STANDARDS: CORPORATE INTEREST,
IDEOLOGY, AND LEADERSHIP IN THE SHAPING OF ACCOUNTING RULES FOR THE MARKET
ECONOMY 6-7 (2015).
115. See, e.g., NCAA, SUMMARY OF NCAA ELIGIBILITY REGULATIONS—NCAA DIVISION I
(2018), https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2018-19_Summary_of_NCAA_Regulations_20
180608.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z825-GVV3].
116. See, e.g., id.
117. See Anticompetitive Practices, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/
anticompetitive-practices [https://perma.cc/AN97-PXYV] (“[A]nticompetitive preactices include
... trade association rules.”).
118. See, e.g., In re Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 549, 606 (1988).
119. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 759 (1999); Cal. Dental Ass’n, 121
F.T.C. 190, 190 (1996).
120. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Robert A. Skitol,
Drinker, Biddle & Reath (Oct. 30, 2006).
121. See Nat’l Soc’y for Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 697 (1978); Am. Med.
Ass’n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443, 451-52 (2d Cir. 1980).
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anticompetitive conduct which proscribe speech that constitutes the
objectionable conduct122 as well as speech that could facilitate ob-
jectionable conduct.123 But we also see it in enforcement agency
guidelines and business review letters that designate what types of
communications are relatively safe or dangerous from an antitrust
prosecution perspective.
8. Boycotts
Another way in which parties may coordinate with one another
is through boycotts. “Courts have interpreted Section 1 to prohibit
competitors from agreeing with one another not to deal, or to deal
only on specified terms, with other economic actors. Cases describe
this conduct in various ways, often referring to a ‘group boycott’ or
a ‘concerted refusal to deal.’”124
Consider first the most basic boycott example. A group of hori-
zontal competitors engage in a concerted refusal to deal with a
supplier unless it reduces its price. This is effectively price fixing
and the boycott is merely a mechanism for the collusion. As in the
naked collusion example discussed previously,125 only anticompeti-
tive harms occur or have the potential to occur and there are no
procompetitive benefits associated with the boycott.126 The speech
at issue is solely a means to the end of the collusive activity. It has
no purpose other than within that narrow sense and it is likely to be
private, as such it has no First Amendment value. When under-
taken to affect price, boycotts are per se illegal.127
Boycotts are generally motivated by dissatisfaction with the ac-
tions of the parties being boycotted and may be partially or fully mo-
tivated by the boycotters’ economic self-interest.128 For example, a
122. See supra Part I.C.1.
123. See supra Parts I.C.2-3.
124. 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 109 (8th ed. 2017).
125. See supra Part I.C.1.
126. Exercising countervailing power to lower price is not generally recognized as
procompetitive. See John B. Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Healthcare Prices, 91 WASH. L. REV.
253, 263 n.43 (2016).
127. See, e.g., Radiant Burners v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659-60
(1961).
128. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 34, at 1038 (“The expressive boycotts this Article
addresses are characterized by speech that is political yet also economically self-interested.”).
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typical boycott involves purchasers who refuse to buy from a seller
perhaps because of some unfairness they attach to the seller such as
its price is “too high” (for example, boycott by buyers of sugar be-
cause of monopolistic pricing by the seller),129 or because of dis-
satisfaction with the seller’s labor practices (for example, boycott
against Nike motivated by the conditions under which its shoes are
manufactured in Asia).130 The latter boycott would be seen as a boy-
cott intended to promote a social goal, whereas the former boycott
would be seen as a reflection of pure economic self-interest. Hence,
boycotts present a useful contrast to the collusion setting in which
there are no procompetitive justifications and the invitation to
collude settings in which there could be a weak efficiency basis for
favoring greater speech.131 Boycotts range from settings where there
is no social value to those in which a speech value is present and
grounded in a noneconomic purpose.
Consider boycotts whose only goals are based on social or political
principles and not self-interested economic benefit. NOW publicly
calls for a nationwide boycott of Missouri’s convention industry
unless Missouri ratifies the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).132
What would standard antitrust analysis look like within such a
case? Arguably there is an anticompetitive effect—the harm to the
local economy, as a result of the boycott.133 There is no procompet-
itive effect, as traditionally defined by antitrust law.134 So, under
conventional antitrust analysis, the boycott would be condemned
under the antitrust laws.135
The foregoing analysis reflects the position adopted by the Mis-
souri Attorney General John Ashcroft and by the dissent in Missouri
129. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 222-23
(1948).
130. See Ashley Lutz, How Nike Shed Its Sweatshop Image to Dominate the Shoe Industry,
BUS. INSIDER (June 6, 2015, 8:38 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-nike-fixed-its-
sweatshop-image-2015-6 [https://perma.cc/2YPE-4NCA].
131. See supra Part I.C.2.
132. See Missouri v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 467 F. Supp. 289, 291 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
133. See Missouri v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301, 1321-22 (8th Cir. 1980) (Gibson,
J., dissenting).
134. See id. at 1311-12 (majority opinion). But note that the ERA is an inherently economic
piece of legislation that would have profound effects on the economy.
135. See id. at 1319-20.
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v. National Organization for Women in the Eighth Circuit.136 That
position did not prevail.137 The majority in the Eighth Circuit found
that the NOW-led boycott reflected an important speech interest
that warranted protection which ultimately took the form of immu-
nization from the antitrust laws.138 The disagreement between the
two parties was not so much over the relative anticompetitive and
procompetitive effects.139 Instead the debate concerned whether or
not the anticompetitive effects were immunized by the First Amend-
ment because the boycott was protected political speech.140 The
Court emphasized that the boycotters did not have direct economic
self-interest in the boycott’s purpose, though it would ultimately
deny that this fact influenced its analysis.141 The majority viewed
the Constitution as prohibiting any tradeoff between the First
Amendment right to petition and antitrust values.142
Boycott settings with mixed political and economic motives pres-
ent more difficult problems when a court feels compelled to decide
between complete immunity and no protection as outcomes. In FTC
v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, the FTC alleged that the
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, a group of lawyers pro-
viding legal services to indigent criminal defendants in the District
of Columbia, organized a boycott with the intent of raising their
rates.143 Evidence was raised that suggested the boycotters were
partially motivated by altruistic social reasons, but even in acknowl-
edging this evidence, in a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court found the
boycott per se illegal and articulated a rule that any economic
interest in a boycott disqualified an immunity defense based on
speech.144
This case also raised another critical twist in terms of a speech
analysis. The appellate court argued that the Superior Court Trial
136. See id. at 1319-22. For a more in-depth treatment of Missouri v. National Orga-
nization for Women, see Greene, supra note 34.
137. See id. at 1318-19.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. Compare id., with id. at 1321-22 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
141. See id. at 1302-03, 1314 (majority opinion).
142. See id. at 1318-19.
143. 493 U.S. 411, 415-19 (1990). For a more in-depth treatment of Superior Court Trial
Lawyers, see, for example, Greene, Muzzling Antitrust, supra note 23, at 55-56.
144. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 426-28.
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Lawyers Association boycott had “an element of expression warrant-
ing First Amendment protection.”145 Here, the boycott was arguably
expressive conduct because it uniquely conveyed through a combina-
tion of hardship and solidarity a rejection of the status quo and did
so publicly.146 It was not merely about facilitating the boycott or
perhaps attracting others to the cause.147 The expressive part makes
the boycott itself speech, but the Supreme Court, working within the
confines of speech as an immunity defense, still rejected the boycott
as speech thereby limiting concern to economic conduct only.148
In summary, while the law regarding polar cases of boycott be-
havior such as involving pure economic self-interest (for example,
Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores149) is relatively clear cut, there
are debates regarding the application of antitrust law to settings
with mixed economic and political interests (for example, Superior
Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n v. FTC150). Furthermore, there is
longstanding ambiguity regarding the circumstances under which
a per se as opposed to rule-of-reason treatment is warranted for
boycotts.151
9. Vertical Price-Fixing
The treatment of vertical price agreements in antitrust has a
somewhat complicated history because of the historically harsh
view antitrust law has had of vertical price fixing juxtaposed with
the desire to protect a firm’s freedom to choose with whom to do
business152 and the economic efficiencies associated with some
145. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
146. See id.
147. Cf. id.
148. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 430-36.
149. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
150. 856 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
151. “[T]he circumstances in which a concerted refusal to deal constitutes a per se unlawful
group boycott today are not clearly defined.” ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 124,
at 110-11.
152. See generally William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions,
and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983, 983-84 (1985) (discussing the history of
judicial and legislative price fixing and noting that Congress eventually passed legislation
“making vertical price-fixing an approved form of business conduct,” but that legislation was
overturned); see also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984).
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structures of agreement.153 Until relatively recently, vertical price
agreements (also known as resale price maintenance) were per se
illegal, though in practice were treated more leniently (at least in
terms of prosecutorial discretion).154 Under older precedent, much
attention was paid to determining whether an agreement existed or,
for example, whether a manufacturer was imposing a (legally
permissible) unilateral policy under which it would only sell to
retailers who set prices above a minimum level.155 Today, vertical
price agreements are handled under a rule of reason analysis,156
which makes market power a necessary condition for illegality157
and allows restrictive agreements to be justified on efficiency
grounds.158
As in the premerger communication analysis,159 the speech
component of vertical agreements is private and limited to those
parties for which some communication, though not necessarily about
price, is justified as necessary to achieve efficiency purposes.
Vertical price-fixing under the older per se treatment constituted an
extreme example of how speech was controlled by the antitrust
laws. For example, manufacturers could unilaterally announce
terms under which they would deal with retailers, but they could
not engage in back-and-forth discussions of those terms. Even un-
der the change largely to rule-of-reason treatment of vertical re-
straints, the nature of communications still plays an important role
in the judicial resolution of such cases.160
153. Vertical price-fixing is one form of distributional restraint. The other class of vertical
restraints involve interbrand competition. See, for example, ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
supra note 124, at 134-221 for a general discussion.
154. See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Analyzing Robinson-Patman, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2064,
2071-72 (2015) (collecting statistics for FTC enforcement).
155. See, e.g., Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. at 763; Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co., 220 U.S. 373, 400 (1911).
156. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 900-04
(2007); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 17-18 (1997).
157. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 898.
158. Id. at 885-86.
159. See supra Part I.C.4.
160. Michael A. Lindsay, Resale Price Maintenance and the World After Leegin, 22
ANTITRUST 32, 36 (2007) (“Leegin greatly reduces the risk of per se liability if the unilateral
policy evolves into a bilateral agreement.”).
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D. Monopolization and Attempted Monopolization
In the preceding Sections, the focus was largely on concerted
action—action involving communications among multiple speakers.
We now turn our attention to matters involving single speakers
which may fall afoul of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
1. Disparagement
If a firm with enough market power to raise monopolization or
attempted monopolization concerns makes materially misleading
statements about a rival’s service, product, or company, the firm
may be liable to a disparagement-based antitrust claim.161 Some
courts do not recognize such claims, while other courts recognize
disparagement at least in theory, but in practice seem to collect
such claims into some larger pattern of actions which is sometimes
referred to as an antitrust “broth.”162
Misleading statements are harmful to competition because they
lead buyers or sellers to make inefficient decisions, whereas accu-
rate statements would improve marketplace decision making.163
Because the content of these statements is often subjective and
involves judgment calls by both the speaker and the listeners,
defendants argue first that their speech is factual (and beneficial)
and therefore fully protected by the First Amendment and that, in
any event, the First Amendment protects their right to express
opinions if the statement is not factually incorrect.164 One key
problem is that statements may lead different listeners to infer
different meanings from the same explicit message.165
161. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 124, at 317-19. But see id. at 319 &
n.686. Materially misleading statements about one’s own product or service would also, in
theory, be liable to antitrust claims (for example, relating to vaporware). See, e.g., Maurice
E. Stucke, How Do (and Should) Competition Authorities Treat a Dominant Firm’s Deception?,
63 SMU L. Rev. 1069, 1097-1102 (2010) (discussing vaporware).
162. See generally Daniel A. Crane, Does Monopoly Broth Make Bad Soup?, 76 ANTITRUST
L.J. 663 (2010) (analyzing the use of antitrust “broth” theory).
163. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 124, at 317.
164. See Greene, Muzzling Antitrust, supra note 23, at 45 (“[T]he expression of opinion
receives substantial protection under the First Amendment.”).
165. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 86, at 170.
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Materially misleading statements about a competitor are typical-
ly prosecuted under the Lanham Act,166 the FTC Act as “deceptive
acts or practices,”167 or related state consumer protection statutes.168
The existence of these alternative legal routes may partially explain
the reluctance of the courts to recognize disparagement as an in-
dependent antitrust claim.169 One can interpret such avoidance as
either strongly favoring speech values or as foisting the tradeoff to
a different legal regime.
2. Predatory Design
Predatory design is another monopolization or attempted
monopolization cause of action which has a history tracing back to
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. and more recently to cases
such as C.R. Bard v. M3 Systems, Inc.170 In such cases, a defendant
with sufficient market power to support an attempted monopoliza-
tion claim is alleged to redesign its product to disadvantage
competitors.171 The mechanism, for example, may be the creation of
intentional incompatibilities to a core product so that a complemen-
tary product of a rival is disadvantaged relative to the complemen-
tary product of the core product producer. Alternatively, it could be
that the output of the core product disadvantages rivals’ ability to
sell products, again relative to a competing product which the core
producer also sells.
As a concrete example of the latter mechanism, consider Goo-
gle’s market-dominant search engine.172 At the risk of oversimpli-
fying, Google’s product returns results according to a particular
166. See Crane, supra note 162, at 672-73.
167. Anticompetitive Practices, supra note 117.
168. See Jeff Miles, Principles of Antitrust Law 30 (2016), https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/healthlaw/01_antitrust_primer_01.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NF3H-XCYD].
169. See Greene, Muzzling Antitrust, supra note 23, at 101 n.315.
170. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1369-72 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 269, 283, 294 (2d Cir. 1979).
171. See, e.g., C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d at 1382-83.
172. Sharon Nelson & John Simek, Making Your Web Site Visible: How to Find a Good Seo
Company, 36 LAW PRACTICE 24, 24 (2010) (“Despite the existence of other search engines like
Yahoo, Bing and Ask, Google remains the indisputable king, with over 65 percent of market
share at present.”); see also Mark R. Patterson, Google and Search-Engine Market Power,
HARV. J.L. & TECH., July 2013.
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algorithm.173 Many competition agencies have examined whether
Google has manipulated its search results to relatively advantage
its own “vertical properties” over competitors’ vertical websites.174
The alleged anticompetitive effect is that Google’s search algorithm
causes competitors’ websites to become so depressed in the rankings
that traffic to their sites decreased, sometimes significantly so.175
The potential procompetitive effects come from the redesigned
search product which Google claims produces higher quality search
rankings for the consumer.176
But what is the potential nexus between predatory design of
information products and speech? In Sorrell v. IMS the Supreme
Court recognized information that was the content of economic
transactions being regulated under Vermont law as speech.177 Not
surprisingly, defendants in cases involving predatory design of
information products such as the Google’s search engine argue that
such products are speech and hence protected by the First Amend-
ment.178
In these cases, the speech is not about facilitating agreements or
characterizing products, the product itself might be considered
speech. Google has argued this point, asserting that the search
engine results are opinions about how to organize information,
similar to what a newspaper would publish.179 The information
product category raises doubt whether our current immunity-based
treatment of the speech-antitrust interface is sufficiently robust to
deliver satisfactory legal outcomes. Under our current regime two
polar outcomes could emerge. Either information products will be
173. See generally How Search Algorithms Work, GOOGLESEARCH (Sept. 6, 2018), https://
www.google.com/search/howsearchworks/algorithms/ [https://perma.cc/D4KG-DR6T].
174. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC FILE NO. 111-0163, STATEMENT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION REGARDING GOOGLE’S SEARCH PRACTICES (2013) [hereinafter STATEMENT ON
GOOGLE SEARCH PRACTICES]; Summary of Commission Decision of 27 June 2017, Case
AT.39740—Google Search (Shopping), 2018 O.J. (C 9/08) ¶ 11-28. While the FTC closed its
investigation without bringing any charges, see STATEMENT ON GOOGLE’S SEARCH PRACTICES,
supra, at 1, the EU has found that Google illegally manipulated its search services. Summary
of Commission Decision, ¶¶ 1-2, 9-10.
175. STATEMENT ON GOOGLE’S SEARCH PRACTICES, supra note 174, at 1-2.
176. See id.
177. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011).
178. See Greene, Muzzling Antitrust, supra note 23, at 37.
179. Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection for Search
Engine Search Results, 8:4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 883, 884 (2012).
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treated as protected speech and will be immune from antitrust
action (which might exempt from antitrust law the whole category
of information products), or information products will be treated as
any other product under the antitrust laws. That is, no solicitude
will be given to the speech characteristics of the product. Either of
these outcomes could, at times, force a complex problem into one of
two crude solutions.
As it turns out, even if information product “speech” is not deem-
ed to merit immunity, it may still be indirectly protected in the lia-
bility stage if it is recognized as contributing to economic value. This
byproduct protection for speech applies quite generally across var-
ious antitrust causes of action and we address this point next.
II. PROTECTION OF SPEECH
Aside from relatively infrequent instances regarding immunity or
remedial issues, First Amendment issues are not explicitly a part of
the antitrust liability analysis.180 Part II examines this phenomenon
and shows how speech with economic efficiency value, nonetheless,
receives some de facto protection in cases subject to rule of reason
treatment.181 Generally, the rule of reason involves a fact-specific
assessments of both the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects
of particular conduct, balancing them against one another, and
condemning those that lead to unreasonable restraints on trade.182
This Section examines whether speech values are accounted for
within a rule of reason assessment and explores whether they could
be accommodated. This requires distinguishing between speech that
180. See supra Parts I.A-B.
181. See GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 4. The alternative to rule of reason treatment is per
se illegality which examines whether the conduct occurred and, if so, the conduct is con-
demned. See supra Part I.C.1. Presently, the only way to escape per se treatment is through
immunity. See Greene, Muzzling Antitrust, supra note 23, at 55 (noting immunity’s all or
nothing character). If that is rejected, there is no room for consideration of speech values or
any other values for that matter. See Greene, supra note 34, at 1040. However, prosecutorial
discretion on the part of antitrust regulators could “soften” this per se treatment in practice,
see Susan S. DeSanti & Ernest A. Nagata, Competitor Communications: Facilitating Practices
or Invitations to Collude? An Application of Theories to Proposed Horizontal Agreements
Submitted for Antitrust Review, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 93, 126-27 (1994), as it did for vertical
price fixing pre-Leegin. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
182. See GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 4.
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is valued for its contributions to efficiency from speech that is not
valued because it does not contribute to efficiency. The latter speech
could serve nonefficiency values, expressive values, or both. How-
ever, in what follows we focus exclusively on nonefficiency values as
they more directly benefit society and not just the speaker.183
Antitrust law’s general rejection of nonefficiency values is clearly
reflected in their notable absence from the case law.184 It is also
evident in the infrequent instances in which they have been ad-
dressed. Long before Superior Court Trial Lawyers,185 the Supreme
Court addressed this issue within the context of professional as-
sociations. In their concurrence in National Society of Professional
Engineers, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Rehnquist, noted
that the “case does not require us to decide whether the ‘Rule of
Reason’ as applied to the professions ever could take account of
benefits other than increased competition.”186 However, they stated
that given the majority’s “holding that ethical norms can pass
muster under the Rule of Reason only if they promote competition,
[they are] not at all certain that the Court leaves enough elbowroom
for realistic application of the Sherman Act to professional ser-
vices.”187
We next address some potential consequences for antitrust law of
not incorporating nonefficiency values in antitrust analysis and
then examine some challenges that would be associated with doing
so. Part II ends by noting how changes in technology, society, and
the law are leading to more instances when speech rights and anti-
trust law will collide.
A. De Facto Protection for the Economic Efficiency Value of Speech
This Section argues that speech contributing to economic effi-
ciency receives de facto protection under rule of reason analysis.
183. Distribution is an example of an economic goal but not one pertaining to economic
efficiency. We include it as a noneconomic efficiency value. 
184. See Greene, supra note 34, at 1052-54 (noting antitrust law’s general disregard for
noneconomic considerations).
185. For discussion of the case, see supra text accompanying notes 143-48.
186. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 699 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
187. Id. at 701.
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Rule of reason analysis focuses on actual competitive effects and, as
such, it indirectly accounts for speech that influences economic
efficiency harms and benefits.188
As an example, consider speech in the form of sharing current
price information. Such an information exchange potentially poses
both anticompetitive harms and procompetitive benefits.189 For
example, price information may facilitate monitoring for cheating
on a collusive scheme while simultaneously allowing buyers to make
better decisions or to drive better bargains.190 The value of these
communications is economic and, given their potential contribution
to economic efficiency, would be accounted for in a rule of reason
analysis.191 We consider this recognition of speech value to be a
byproduct of antitrust law’s focus on economic efficiency rather than
its concern for the value of speech qua speech.192 The landscape
survey notes many other information-sharing circumstances (for
example, premerger information exchange and joint ventures)
where the economic benefits and costs of the communications are
considered within antitrust proceedings.193
While the foregoing information-sharing examples involve co-
ordinated effects, speech also plays a role in single-firm antitrust
matters including monopolization or attempted monopolization.194
Part I discussed the alleged predatory redesign of products by a firm
with market power in which it is claimed that “the redesign creates
intentional, and potentially unnecessary, incompatibilities with
rival products.”195 In general, such cases turn on whether redesign
was innovative which is a procompetitive defense.196 Given any
colorable claim to innovation the courts typically have not found
that such redesigns violate the antitrust laws, so much so that
innovation would appear to receive a form of per se legal
treatment.197 The cause of action for a redesign of information
188. See Miles, supra note 168, at 52-53.
189. See Rosch, supra note 100, at 1-2.
190. See id.
191. See GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 4.
192. See Greene, supra note 34, at 1040.
193. See, e.g., supra Parts I.C.4-5.
194. See supra Part I.D.
195. Greene, Muzzling Antitrust, supra note 23, at 72.
196. See id. at 71-79.
197. Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp., LP, 592 F.3d 991, 1000
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products such as a search engines is different, where the concern,
for example, is use of the search engine to disadvantage rivals of the
search engine firm’s other businesses (for example, Internet travel
sites) rather than disadvantaging rivals through product incompati-
bilities. In the search engine scenario, there is arguably a one-to-one
correspondence between the presence of the alleged innovation
(facilitated through underlying algorithms) and the claimed im-
provements in usefulness of search responses (speech).198 Under an
antitrust rule of reason analysis, then, a nontrivial improvement in
speech outcomes constitutes innovation and is, therefore, protected.
This protection of speech is a byproduct of jurisprudential deference
to innovation. It does not originate from the specific efficiency value
of improvements at issue.199
Even when the antitrust laws operate to provide de facto pro-
tection of speech, is a cost imposed as the result of that protection
being indirect rather than direct? Quite possibly yes. The most
obvious cost is that indirect protection could be too little because the
level of protection accorded the direct concern is inadequate to
protect the indirect concern. Continuing with the innovation ex-
ample, antitrust doctrine regarding innovation arguably protects
speech in information products to the extent that the underlying
speech improves economic efficiency and, hence, is considered to
constitute innovation. But lacking an efficiency improvement,
speech which might serve a nonefficiency social value would be
unprotected.
Two other costs of indirect protection are subtler. Indirect pro-
tection has an inherent degree of intertemporal unreliability as-
sociated with it.200 Regardless of how much protection is conferred
indirectly on speech, if the antitrust law changes then so too may
(9th Cir. 2010) (arguing against trying to balance the value of innovation against
anticompetitive harm); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(finding claimed procompetitive innovation not substantiated so balancing unnecessary); see,
e.g., Greene, Muzzling Antitrust, supra note 23, at 77 (“Notwithstanding the foregoing
examples wherein courts strongly guarded their prerogative to engage in balancing, no court
has done so (or acknowledged doing so) to any meaningful extent. This disagreement re-
garding the appropriate analysis of alleged predatory design has been largely sidestepped in
practice.” (footnote omitted)). 
198. See supra text accompanying notes 172-89.
199. See Greene, Muzzling Antitrust, supra note 23, at 39.
200. See supra Part I.B.
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the protection afforded speech.201 But, while such changes to
antitrust may impact the protection of speech values, those changes
are unlikely to be informed by those values. The question is not just
whether there is sufficient protection but also whether such
protection is secure.
Along similar lines, the indirect concern inherits ambiguity
associated with the direct concern along with uncertainty regarding
the extent of protection accorded the indirect concern.202 In essence,
if the law expressly at issue (that is, antitrust) is particularly
ambiguous, then so too will be the resulting contours of the indirect
protection. In the innovation case the status quo is both extremely
protective and fairly unambiguous because it essentially results in
de facto legality when innovation is invoked.203 However, most anti-
trust issues receive more nuanced treatment, often decidedly so.204
And, it is possible for antitrust to evolve in ways that prove to be
less speech protective in the future.
Overall, this analysis suggests that, as a practical matter, a
byproduct of antitrust law’s focus upon economic efficiency is some
level of de facto speech protection. In other words, rule of reason
201. Antitrust law evolves to reflect improvements in knowledge of theory, empirical
methods, and in response to new fact patterns. These factors make legal development depend
on when and how new understandings and new application techniques are developed. This
path dependency implies that one would expect a law (that is, antitrust) that does not directly
address First Amendment values to depart somewhat from a jurisprudence developed with
First Amendment values in mind—even with generally consonant objectives. One example
of path dependent and evolutionary changes in antitrust law is the recognition of merger
efficiencies in antitrust merger analysis. While it has always been obvious that mergers offer
significant potential for efficiencies, “the easy to claim, difficult to realize” character of such
efficiencies has resulted in a slow recognition of merger efficiencies from almost no recognition
to today’s limited recognition. See, for example, Dennis A. Yao & Kevin J. Arquit, Applying
the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 6 ANTITRUST 17, 17-19 (1992) for a general discussion
of the practical problems of applying various analytical approaches to merger analysis. 
202. This ambiguity could lead to some chilling of procompetitive conduct. See, e.g., United
States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 (1978) (the imposition of criminal liability on
a corporate official without inquiry into intent “holds out the distinct possibility of
overdeterrence ... [of] ... salutary and procompetitive conduct lying close to the borderline of
impermissible conduct”).
203. See supra text accompanying note 196.
204. Furthermore, although the economic value associated with speech seems largely
protected by spillovers, that protection is obtained through a full rule of reason analysis which
involves considerable discovery and trial costs. See generally supra note 97. To the extent that
speech values might short-circuit such an intensive process, one could argue that speech is
undervalued.
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analysis accounts for the procompetitive impact of speech even when
there is no direct consideration of First Amendment rights. Such de
facto protection is a partial answer to the question of why the First
Amendment is not addressed more often in antitrust matters given
antitrust’s operation as a form of speech control. When the domi-
nant value of speech is based on its instrumental contribution to
economic efficiency, de facto protection would appear to offer non-
trivial protection of speech interests.205
B. The Challenges Associated with Protecting Nonefficiency 
Values of Speech
Speech receives some de facto protection within the antitrust
setting because it furthers the value of economic efficiency.206 But
should its protection also extend to its nonefficiency considerations?
Or would such an approach open a Pandora’s box of philosophical
and workability problems that would better remain closed?
This Section examines arguments for and against broadening the
antitrust rule of reason analysis to include nonefficiency values pro-
moted by speech or directly associated with it. Speech could be val-
ued for its contribution to a social purpose, its contribution to the
“marketplace of ideas,” and the value of speech as self-expression.207
The first two are more directly utilitarian, since the contribution is
more narrowly focused on the betterment of society. The first value
205. Protection of speech according to its contribution to economic efficiency is a decidedly
antitrust view of speech. See Greene, supra note 34, at 1052. Using a First Amendment
perspective, such an analysis can be thought of as determining the antitrust government
interest for any restrictions in speech that may be included in the remedy. A speech
restriction would be only justified if, when considering the procompetitive value of speech, a
net antitrust harm is proven. If so, then any speech restriction would need to be sufficiently
tailored to meet the appropriate level of scrutiny which, in this case, is presumably that of
commercial speech. See Greene, Muzzling Antitrust, supra note 23, at 59. See generally supra
text accompanying notes 38-41. Given the constitutional nature of the First Amendment, this
level of scrutiny presumably exceeds that associated with a nonspeech antitrust remedy. The
limit to the severity of the restraint at this remedy stage is determined by the category of
speech, not by the content of the speech. See, e.g., Greene, Muzzling Antitrust, supra note 23,
at 58-59. Nonetheless, less onerous restraints could be imposed, reflecting the court’s view of
the antitrust conduct that is being remedied.
206. See Greene, supra note 34, at 1052 (“[E]conomic efficiency has come to ... dominate
antitrust analysis.”).
207. See Greene, Muzzling Antitrust, supra note 23, at 92.
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reflects the direct impact of the speech on social outcomes, while the
second can be thought of as protecting the process of social discourse
that may indirectly improve society. This Section discusses the
implications for broadening protection to include these utilitarian
nonefficiency benefits of speech. After discussing whether reform is
needed, we examine the challenges associated with assessing
speech’s direct contribution to nonefficiency outcomes and with
accounting for speech’s indirect contribution. 
1. Considerations For and Against Broadening 
First Amendment Protection
As discussed in Part II.A, speech values already receive limited
recognition within antitrust proceedings. As a thought experiment,
this Section briefly explores key arguments for and against
expanding that protection. The differences between those positions
can be understood in terms of what is to gain (how adequate is the
current regime in protecting First Amendment values? What is the
value of the incremental speech protection?), what is to lose (what
is the harm to antitrust values including potential decreased
predictability? Are there broader implications for noneconomic
values more generally?), and how do those effects compare?
We know the extreme positions on the ultimate question of how
to compare that would unreservedly favor one regime and entirely
eviscerate the other. Fortunately, such positions have not prevailed.
But what of the countless intermediate positions that involve the
possibility of tradeoffs? For example, those favoring increased First
Amendment protections could do so for any number of reasons,
including a sense that the current antitrust regime imposes a very
weighty burden upon speech, and thus reforms to reduce that
burden are justified even when they impose substantial costs on the
antitrust regime. Another possibility would be that the cost to the
antitrust regime associated with greater speech protection is
sufficiently low so that even smaller amounts of increased speech
protection are justified. Alternatively, those disfavoring expanded
First Amendment protections may believe speech interests are
currently well protected and that further protections would be of
2019] ANTITRUST AS SPEECH CONTROL 1253
minimal value while, perhaps, extracting unduly heavy penalties
upon the antitrust regime.
The context of expressive boycotts illustrates how society fails to
adequately confront tradeoffs presented in complicated situations
in which noneconomic and economic purposes are intertwined.
Superior Court Trial Lawyers involved such hybrid speech in which
the First Amendment value of the speech as well as its antitrust
harms derived from the boycott itself.208 Because the speech
combined economic as well as noneconomic interests, the Court
withheld any First Amendment solicitude.209 The Court justified this
oversimplification claiming that, “[a] rule that requires courts to
apply the antitrust laws ‘prudently and with sensitivity’ whenever
an economic boycott has an ‘expressive component’ would create a
gaping hole in the fabric of those laws.”210 But, such oversimplifica-
tion arguably operates in both directions. There is no middle
ground.
For a different example of the First Amendment-antitrust
interface, consider NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., a case that
involved an NAACP-organized boycott against white merchants in
Claiborne County, Mississippi.211 Elected officials, who were white,
were presented with “a list of particularized demands for racial
equality and integration.”212 When a “satisfactory response” was not
received, a boycott of the “white merchants in the area” ensued.213
Some targeted merchants sued based on antitrust grounds and
tortious interference with business relations.214 The initial award of
more than a million dollars in the Chancery Court was appealed to
the Mississippi Supreme Court.215 That court reversed stating that
the United States Supreme Court mandated that “boycotts to
achieve political ends are not a violation of the Sherman Act.”216
Although only the tort-related claims would come before the United
208. See FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 426-28 (1990).
209. Id. at 431-32.
210. Id.
211. 458 U.S. 886, 889 (1982).
212. Id. For a more in-depth treatment of Claiborne Hardware, see Greene, Antitrust
Censorship, supra note 34, at 1060-63. 
213. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 889.
214. Id. at 890-93.
215. Id. at 893-94.
216. Id. at 894.
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States Supreme Court,217 its ruling regarding how to handle hybrid
speech has important implications for antitrust law. The Court
pointedly characterized the boycott as noneconomic: “There is no
suggestion that the NAACP ... or the individual defendants were in
competition with the white businesses or that the boycott arose from
parochial economic interests.”218 This dovetailed with the Court’s
holding that the First Amendment protected “a nonviolent, political-
ly motivated boycott designed to force governmental and economic
change and to effectuate rights guaranteed by the Constitution it-
self.”219 As such, the award for the plaintiffs was reversed.220
While the Court’s decision was correct, it also arguably oversim-
plified aspects of the case. For example, there was some economic
self-interest involved because one or more boycotters owned a store
that apparently benefited from the boycott.221 Additionally, the boy-
cott demand that, “[a]ll stores must employ Negro clerks and ca-
shiers” could, in theory, redound to some boycotter’s benefit.222 Was
there a concern that First Amendment immunity from liability
(including antitrust liability) arguably would have been imperiled
if any economic purpose were attached to the speech? In fact, Pro-
fessors Areeda and Hovenkamp have argued more specifically that
the First Amendment should not shield from antitrust liability any
African American “merchant who stands to benefit directly from any
decline in business to its white competitors.”223
But the challenges posed by such mixed purpose speech are still
wider. Consider, for example, firms whose goals include social
objectives relating to issues such as sustainability,224 social re-
sponsibility, and workplace conditions.225 Firms adopting practices
217. See id. at 896-98.
218. Id. at 915.
219. Id. at 914.
220. Id. at 934.
221. See id. at 937.
222. Id. at 900.
223. 1B PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 191-92 (3d ed. 2006).
224. See generally Richard A. Clarke et al., The Challenge of Going Green, HARV. BUS. REV.,
July-Aug. 1994, at 37, 37-38.
225. The motivations to pursue social purposes sometimes reflect management’s belief that
pursuing such purposes directly translates into profits. However, frequently the connection
between the social purpose in question and profit is arguably based more on faith than on
hard-headed business analysis. See, e.g., Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy &
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associated with such self-identified social purposes will usually
share that information with their stakeholders, and perhaps even
welcome or encourage similar activity by other market partic-
ipants.226 What are the pros and cons associated with antitrust
scrutiny reflecting a more expansive view of First Amendment
protections within this context?
Under current antitrust law, self-identified social purposes have
not been countenanced as a justification for otherwise anticompeti-
tive behavior in part because the designation such purposes and the
manner in which they are not societally sanctioned.227 It does not
matter if the outcomes of private action are beneficial. But, for the
sake of argument, suppose that society wanted to expand protection
of speech in an antitrust analysis by providing limited recognition
of the direct nonefficiency benefits facilitated by the speech. Such an
analysis would be the nonefficiency benefit analog of the efficiency
benefit in a market effects analysis.228 Beyond the possible policy
objections associated with such an expansion, it raises a number of
serious implementation problems. How would one measure non-
efficiency effects and, once measured, how would one value the
effects and compare them to anticompetitive harms? What level of
proof would be required to establish various effects?229 Furthermore,
Society: The Link Between Competitive Advantage and Corporate Responsibility, 84 HARV.
BUS. REV. 78 (2006).
226. Lack of recognition accorded the nonefficiency benefits of speech may chill a firm’s
willingness to speak on some social issues because of fears of increased risk from antitrust
actions. In contrast to lack of aggressive enforcement that leads to visible actions by firms,
lack of recognition of benefits would be relatively invisible because it results in a lack of action
by firms. 
227. Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1941). 
228. This approach would also eliminate per se antitrust treatment when speech is
involved.
229. Attempts to measure effects of corporate social responsibility actions have, for
example, included creation of social responsibility or sustainability scorecards, but these
measures are aggregated at the firm level with effects that may result as much from long-
term efforts as immediate efforts. See CORI CUNNINGHAM, THE CONFERENCE BOARD,
MEASURING THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE SOCIAL INVESTMENTS 37 (2014), https://corporate-
citizenship.com/wp-content/uploads/Measuring-Social-Impact.compressed.pdf [https://perma.
cc/YRQ9-DV34]. Given antitrust law’s skepticism toward claims regarding procompetitive
efficiencies, antitrust law’s standard of proof may resist claims of social benefit. In the case
of claimed efficiencies in competitor collaborations, for example, the FTC and DOJ Guidelines
state that “participants must substantiate efficiency claims so that the Agencies can verify
by reasonable means the likelihood and magnitude of each asserted efficiency; how and when
each would be achieved; any costs of doing so.... Efficiency claims are not considered if they
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as the impact of any given speech depends on what else has been
said as well as the other actions taken by the firm, how can one
apportion benefits and harm to the anticompetitive part of speech?
These implementation problems are daunting, but arguably not
insurmountable. Outside of antitrust, courts have balanced incom-
mensurate values.230 Even within antitrust, courts have found ways
(albeit often extremely limited) to handle comparisons between
static price effects and dynamic innovation effects.231
Overall, expanding protection of speech in an antitrust liability
analysis would seem difficult to justify on the basis of the direct
nonefficiency benefits alone. But what if one considers the contribu-
tion of speech to the marketplace of ideas? The “marketplace of
ideas” rationale essentially refocuses the utilitarian benefit from the
social purpose that speech might facilitate to the benefit of free
speech itself. Furthermore, the significance of objections to self-
identified social purpose as were raised in Fashion Originators’
Guild 232 would be diminished in force because the social purpose
here is embodied as a constitutional right.233 This constitutional
are vague or speculative.” GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 24.
230. The incommensurability problem can be seen—or rather not seen—in the treatment
of the First Amendment defense in antitrust cases. Antitrust does not directly recognize
noneconomic speech values once a court determines that the challenged conduct does not
warrant immunity from the antitrust law, and, of course, if immunity is granted, then
antitrust values are not considered. This binary categorization of outcomes which determines
separate spheres of influence avoids incommensurate tradeoffs between speech and antitrust
values. Such an approach has the potential to reduce the variability in judicial determinations
because identifying simple rules for assigning matters to one category or another is easier
than finding a reliable method to compare speech and efficiency values. While legislative
bodies are constantly making decisions involving incommensurate values, are there principled
ways to handle incommensurate values under the process requirements of the legal system?
A detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, but we note that
incommensurate values is a problem plaguing other legal regimes, so it may be instructive
to examine how this problem is handled elsewhere. See, for example, Nien-hê Hsieh, Incom-
mensurable Values, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2016) for a review of the
philosophical arguments pertaining to comparing incommensurable values.
231. Hillary Greene, Non-Per Se Treatment of Buyer Price-Fixing in Intellectual Property
Settings, 2011 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 57, 77-80.
232. Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1941).
233. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Skepticism toward extending antitrust analysis to nonefficiency
purposes also reflects that most social purposes have distributional effects which fall under
the domain of legislative bodies. Protection of rights or process, on the other hand, are tasks
better suited to the courts. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
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right also differentiates free speech from legislatively prescribed
social purposes.
Focusing on the process of social discourse rather than on the
outcomes facilitated by speech eliminates the need to value speech
according to its contribution to a social purpose and could be
implemented by establishing a category of speech deserving of
solicitude and giving all speech in that category the same value.
This tentative “same value approach” reflects First Amendment
jurisprudence, which generally avoids discrete content assessments
in favor of rough categorizations of speech (for example, commercial
versus political speech).234 Under this approach, corporate speech
would not be subject to the overt utilitarianism that animates
antitrust law and, as a result, the immensely difficult measurement
problem would be replaced with the comparatively easier solicitude
or no solicitude determination. The bluntness of the approach
reflects the problem’s thorny nature and is far from perfect. But it
offers a benefit relative to the current system wherein the speech
value in the antitrust liability analysis is zero absent efficiency
contributions.235
Of course, adding a speech-based nonefficiency element to an-
titrust liability analysis would increase complexity directly and,
perhaps, even open the door to a broader range of noneconomic
considerations.236 From this perspective, the costs of complexity go
beyond that of any individual antitrust case to a general increase in
uncertainty that a firm faces when assessing actions that may entail
antitrust risk. Along these lines, simple rules, even if imperfect,
may provide clearer guidance to business and, perhaps, may even
feel less arbitrary.
A primary element to the aforementioned “same value approach”
is determining which speech does or does not deserve solicitude. We
now explore an example of how one might undertake this assess-
ment that permits us to discuss a number of workability-related
234. See David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78
CALIF. L. REV. 359, 360-63 (1990).
235. See supra Part I.C.
236. See generally Lee Goldman, The Politically Correct Corporation and the Antitrust
Laws: The Proper Treatment of Noneconomic or Social Welfare Justifications under Section
1 of the Sherman Act, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 137 (1995) for a discussion of the merits of
including noneconomic factors in antitrust analyses.
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challenges. We then conclude with a brief discussion of how one
might balance a speech benefit against anticompetitive harms.
2. Distinguishing Speech Deserving of Solicitude—An
Illustrative Example
What factors could one use to determine whether particular
speech is deserving of solicitude in an antitrust liability analysis?
We tentatively explore criteria based on the speech content, the
speaker’s intent, and the circumstances in which the speech
occurred through a test loosely based on the Seventh Circuit ruling
in Wilk v. American Medical Association, which provided defendants
the possibility of a very limited noneconomic justification for a
boycott with an anticompetitive effect.237 Wilk’s test, which provides
antitrust solicitude based on a nonefficiency value (dubbed the
“patient care motive”)238 is instructive in how one might devise
recognition of a speech value. For discussion purposes, we assume
that freedom of speech is valued beyond its contribution to economic
efficiency and that it should receive recognition as a partial offset to
anticompetitive harm within an antitrust liability analysis. It is
helpful to remember that this recognition is not premised on the
social purpose of the speech per se, it is premised on the value of
speech itself. Nonetheless, the social purpose of the speech influ-
ences the proposed legal standard, as we explore next.
As applied in the speech context, a firm would receive limited
recognition for the nonefficiency value of its speech if the speech is
directed primarily towards a nonefficiency social purpose. In
particular, recognition requires that (1) the claimed purpose has
well-established merit; (2) the firm is seriously committed to the
claimed nonefficiency purpose through its pattern of actions and
communications generally; (3) the speech in question is directly
linked to achieving the claimed nonefficiency purpose; and (4) a
reasonable alternative way to achieve the claimed purpose without
237. 719 F.2d 207, 227 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he burden of persuasion is on the defendants to
show: (1) that they genuinely entertained a concern ... (2) that this concern is objectively
reasonable; (3) that this concern has been the dominant motivating factor ... and (4) that this
concern ... could not have been adequately satisfied in a manner less restrictive of
competition.”).
238. Id. at 221.
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contributing to the anticompetitive conduct at issue, is unavail-
able.239 The serious commitment, direct linkage, and less restrictive
alternative requirements probe whether the claimed purpose of the
speech is primary or secondary. Assuming that an anticompetitive
harm has been established, if the purpose appears to be secondary
then it is more likely that the anticompetitive outcome was the
primary motivation for the speech and, accordingly, that speech
would not be recognized even if it did facilitate a meritorious social
purpose.
If these tests are satisfied, then the speech would be recognized.
The next implementation challenge facing the court is how to weigh
the nonefficiency value along with other values such as an anti-
competitive effect.
The well-established merit requirement is intended to deny rec-
ognition to nonefficiency speech that does not facilitate a social pur-
pose.240 Such determinations will, at times, be quite difficult. That
challenge is heightened by the unavailability of clear decision rules.
However, some possible indicia for well-established merit could
include whether U.S. local, state, or federal governments or well-
respected international NGOs are pursuing the same or similar
purposes. This potentially messy definitional problem would need
to be worked out by courts over time.
The serious commitment to the claimed purpose seeks to distin-
guish positions that are sincere from those that are feigned.241
Recognition of nonefficiency speech gives defendants an ex-post in-
centive to characterize speech subject to antitrust scrutiny as sup-
porting a nonefficiency goal.242 Along similar lines, it might give a
firm an ex-ante incentive to create insurance for potentially anti-
competitive speech by giving that speech an actual (but presumably
239. See id.
240. This requirement is related to the “concern is objectively reasonable” requirement in
Wilk but, of course, differs because the Wilk court was not willing to entertain general public
interest purposes unrelated to patient care. 
241. See GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 12 n.35 (“[P]rocompetitive intent does not preclude
a violation....[b]ut extrinsic evidence of intent may aid in evaluating market power, the
likelihood of anticompetitive harm, and claimed procompetitive justifications where an
agreement’s effects are otherwise ambiguous.” (citation omitted)); supra text accompanying
note 239.
242. See GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 12.
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secondary) nonefficiency purpose.243 To prevent abuse, a high
threshold for this requirement is needed.
Distinguishing serious from feigned commitments might be
possible if a clear pattern of actions and communications supporting
the claimed nonefficiency purpose could be established by the
defendant.244 The workability of such an approach is an open
question, but there would be many instances in which a serious
purpose would be easy to infer. For example, the seriousness of the
purpose can be evaluated by asking whether nonefficiency speech
itself was communicated in a manner that suggests the purpose was
promotion of the asserted nonefficiency purpose and the firm’s
commitment to this purpose predates the alleged anticompetitive
conduct.245
Next, assuming a serious commitment to a meritorious purpose,
it is useful to assess whether achieving that purpose was a primary
motivation for the speech. Is there a direct linkage between the
speech in question and the nonefficiency purpose and, if so, is there
a less restrictive alternative to the speech in question? Directness
presumably increases as the speech content supports fewer alter-
native interpretations other than the claimed nonefficiency pur-
pose. The linkage is also more likely to be more direct when the
claimed purpose is relatively restrictive regarding what speech
243. See id.
244. The sincerity and seriousness of a nonefficiency purpose for speech could be inferred
from a consistent set of corporate actions and communications constituting a credible
narrative which the firm has found costly to develop. See id. Absolute consistency comes at
a high cost when consistency is economically inconvenient or conflicts with another
organizational purpose. Inconsistencies and counterexamples to a set of espoused purposes
or positions put those purposes into question. See Wilk, 719 F.2d at 227. As a practical matter,
one would expect that consistency positively correlates with a sincere pursuit of purpose, so
greater consistency provides stronger evidence than less consistency that a firm is pursuing
the claimed purpose. See supra text accompanying note 239. Within the context of Noerr-
Pennington, see supra note 29, the Court has held “First Amendment rights may not be used
as the means or the pretext for achieving ‘substantive evils’ ... which the legislature has the
power to control. Certainly the constitutionality of the antitrust laws is not open to debate.”
Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515 (1972).
245. For example, public speech might be more effective than private speech in achieving
the claimed social purpose, because the social impact of speech is likely to increase with the
number of listeners. In contrast, efficiency-oriented goals might be better achieved with
private speech when such conversations involve sensitive, proprietary, or even embarrassing
information. This is not to say that private speech cannot still have expressive or
nonefficiency purposes.
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would support it. For example, a vague social purpose, such as
environmental sustainability, can be supported by a much wider
range of speech content than a more precise social purpose such as
eliminating child labor in a firm’s supply chain.
The less restrictive alternative test as applied here asks whether
the purported nonefficiency purpose of the relevant speech could be
achieved through less restrictive means, such as through other
speech that does not contribute to an antitrust concern.246 This test
offers an indirect way to determine whether the claimed social
purpose is primary. If the unused alternative is obvious to the firm,
perhaps because it had been used previously, then the choice not to
use the alternative is evidence supporting the proposition that the
firm’s primary purpose may have been anticompetitive. The test
itself is quite conservative in its bias against recognizing speech for
which a more antitrust-benign alternative exists.247
When applying a less restrictive alternative test, courts or pros-
ecutors should not be unduly aggressive when second-guessing de-
cisions of the business decision maker.248 As an example of how a
less restrictive alternative test works in a more conventional anti-
trust setting, consider the DOJ/FTC Guidelines on Collaborations.
They state that, in the context of efficiency-creating collaborative
246. See Greene, Muzzling Antitrust, supra note 23, at 85; C. Scott Hemphill, Less
Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 929 (2016); Dennis A. Yao
& Thomas N. Dahdouh, Information Problems in Merger Decision Making and Their Impact
on Development of an Efficiencies Defense, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 23, 36 (1993).
247. The test also has the attractive feature that, by identifying an alternative that
achieves the same purpose without a concomitant antitrust risk, it allows a court to reject
speech without determining how much the speech contributes to achievement of the purported
nonefficiency purpose. The less-restrictive alternatives approach is analogous to cost-
effectiveness analysis, a common public policy tool, which also avoids toting up costs and
benefits by selecting the choice that achieves the same benefit at the lowest possible cost. The
ends-means tailoring used in First Amendment scrutiny of government restrictions on speech
functions as an attenuated form of a less-restrictive-alternatives test. For a government
interest that is important enough to pass the ends part of the test, the speech restriction has
to achieve those ends in an appropriately tailored fashion. One component of appropriate
tailoring is that there does not exist an alternative way to achieve the government interest
that is appropriately less restrictive of the speech restriction in question. The First
Amendment use of scrutiny is one form of the less restrictive alternatives test. See Alan O.
Sykes, The Least Restrictive Means, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 403, 403 (2003).
248. The less restrictive alternatives test manifests itself differently when addressing
constitutionally protected speech as opposed to business discretion. One expects, for example,
more latitude to be allowed to varying forms of speech than different types of business (non-
speech) conduct.
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agreements, “if the participants could have achieved ... similar ef-
ficiencies by practical, significantly less restrictive means” then
claimed efficiencies from the agreement will not potentially offset
anticompetitive effects.249 With experience, courts and the prosecut-
ing agencies have developed indicia for what constitutes a “signifi-
cantly less restrictive means” such as whether the firm or other
firms in similar situations had implemented the alternative means
in the past.250 Despite practical challenges associated with the less
restrictive alternative test,251 this approach has much to commend
it.
3. Balancing
Assuming the presence of a benefit flowing from cognizable
speech, how might the noneconomic benefits and antitrust harms
associated with the speech in question be balanced? In the previous
Section we discussed two approaches to balancing. The first
approach would assess both the level of antitrust harm and the level
of speech benefit and then engage in a rough comparison. While the
antitrust community is experienced in assessing antitrust harm, it
lacks experience with assessing speech benefits. As suggested above,
this makes the latter assessment more difficult and as a conse-
quence, the comparison even more challenging.252
The second approach is less demanding. Assuming the presence
of cognizable speech, this approach would accord speech a small
positive offset against anticompetitive harm that is independent of
the content of the speech. Hence, the focus of the “comparison” is the
size of the antitrust harm. If the antitrust harm is small, then the
249. GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 24.
250. See id.
251. See Yao & Dahdouh, supra note 246, at 36.
252. And second, is making such tradeoffs consistent with how one thinks about the special
value associated with free speech? As a balancing test, antitrust rule-of-reason analysis is
based on economics, which is fundamentally the social science of tradeoffs. See, e.g., State Oil
Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). The First Amendment, in contrast, while sometimes forced
to make coarse tradeoffs, concerns rights over which tradeoffs are often avoided. Yet some
assessment of the public policy interest in restricting speech is a component in a First
Amendment analysis. See FARBER, supra note 16, at 21 (“Although the language of ‘balancing’
is out of favor, in case after case the Court has had to decide if particular state interests
justify regulation of speech, and if so, to what extent.”)
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benefit offsets the harm and there is no liability. But when the
antitrust harm is substantial, antitrust liability is found. In other
settings, the degree to which speech as part of a larger pattern of
conduct raises additional questions regarding parsing antitrust
harm across the entire set of actions that constitute the offending
conduct.253
Exploring in depth the full range of approaches for expanding
speech protections within antitrust settings is beyond the scope of
this Article. Our goal was merely to address one possible approach.
And, while further consideration is essential, concrete evidence may
be hard to come by, not because this problem is rarely encountered,
but because current law does not invite express treatment of it.
C. A Speculative Look at Future Challenges
Many social and economic trends bear on the overlap between the
antitrust and First Amendment legal regimes. Here, we briefly
consider several trends that underscore the increasing importance
of better handling this overlap. First, the era in which firms can
justify their place in society purely as providing shareholder value
may be over. The global financial crises and general concerns about
sustainability have led firms and managers to embrace a broader
conception of themselves.254 In so doing, one can expect firms and
managers to become even more vocal and active in staking out
positions that, while advancing firm interests, may be defined more
broadly than profit goals as conventionally understood.255 Such
253. One could apply a variant of the second approach to the remedy phase of the trial
rather than to the antitrust liability analysis. That is, leave the liability analysis as is, but
when speech meets the recognition tests described above, adjust the First Amendment
constraint on allowable remedies to reflect the size of the antitrust harm. For a more in-depth
treatment rlated to these approaches, see Greene, Muzzling Antitrust, supra note 23, at 94-95. 
254. See, e.g., George Serafeim, The Role of the Corporation in Society: An Alternative View
and Opportunities for Future Research (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-110, 2014);
Andrew Winston, Businesses Do—and Should—Play a Role in Creating a Better Society,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 24, 2015, 3:10 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/
2015/aug/24/kingfisher-dow-unilever-peter-drucker-ge-ngo-sustainability [https://perma.cc/
YQF8-SCBF].
255. Another recent legal and social development may further complicate the speech and
antitrust tradeoff. The controversial Citizens United decision finding political speech rights
for corporations may give greater scope to arguments that commercial entities have a right
to express opinions that have both political and trade effects. See generally Citizens United
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positioning could result in increased antitrust concerns. For ex-
ample, social pressure could incentivize firms to pursue collective
responses characterized by hybrid communications.256
Second, the economy is increasingly becoming information driven
with an attendant surge in the provision and value of information
products.257 As discussed, information products embody speech and
hence predatory redesign of such products creates an inseparability
between conduct and speech.258 Furthermore, the information and
digitization revolution, in turn, is changing the nature of informa-
tion and product provision from business models that reduced costs
by taking advantage of scale to those that are based on mass
customization.259 While mass customization has enormous benefits
to consumers, the ability to customize information products raises
the prospect that firms with market power may also choose to shape
products to reflect their stakeholder or manager preferences.260 We
speculate that such preferences, as manifested in information prod-
ucts, could be defended as speech even if those preferences might
also serve anticompetitive ends. Consider a multibusiness firm that
operates a search engine and whose other product lines appear as
results on its search engine. To the extent that the same preferences
(for example, for ecotourism) inform both its search engine and its
other product lines (for example, tourism-related enterprises), the
former might favor the latter relative to the latter’s competitors.
v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
256. See, e.g., David P. Baron, Private Politics, 12 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 31 (2003)
(discussing how activists pressure firms to take “responsible” actions).
257. See, e.g., Greene, Muzzling Antitrust, supra note 23, at 41.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 172-79. If information products are considered
protected speech, then large and increasingly important portions of the economy could be
exempted from antitrust protection for broad categories of action. See Greene, supra note 23,
at 89. If, alternatively, information products are considered to be unprotected speech, pro-
tection of speech values would depend solely on economic considerations. See Greene, supra
note 34, at 1040; supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
259. See James H. Gilmore & B. Joseph Pine II, The Four Faces of Mass Customization,
HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 91.
260. Daisuke Wakabayashi & Cecilia Kang, Google’s Pichai Faces Privacy and Bias
Questions in Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/
technology/google-pichai-house-committee-hearing.html [https://perma.cc/7W2C-6B3D]
(discussing congressional Republicans’ worry that Google’s search results are biased towards
liberal positions). 
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This favoritism could emerge even without any specific intent to
favor one’s own product lines.
Third, recent years have also witnessed a resurgence of antitrust
populism which advocates more aggressive antitrust enforcement to
curtail what they see as an increasing consolidation of economic
power. This position is founded on a belief that the economy has
become increasingly concentrated and that this increased concen-
tration generally harms consumers and negatively impacts other
social goals regarding, for example, income distribution and the
balance of political power in society.261 Whether or not more ag-
gressive antitrust enforcement makes sense, (re)introducing non-
efficiency goals raises similar measurement and commensurability
problems associated with increased speech protection. However, one
stark difference characterizes the consequences of increased con-
sideration of speech versus other nonefficiency based considerations
(for example, distribution). Increased solicitude for speech values
would, all things being equal, lead to less antitrust liability whereas
greater incorporation of nonefficiency considerations unrelated to
speech would lead to greater antitrust liability.262
Finally, First Amendment law may evolve in ways that are un-
related to antitrust matters but may have, nonetheless, important
consequences for antitrust. There has been constant, arguably
increasing, criticism of the commercial speech standard. For ex-
ample, Justice Thomas is a persistent critic of intermediate scrutiny
and he would apply strict scrutiny to commercial speech.263 This
261. For a leading proponent of so-called neo-populism, see generally Barry C. Lynn, COR-
NERED: THE NEW MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND THE ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION (2010). But see
Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714 (2018). Of course,
the more populist impulses associated with antitrust have long received attention even during
the more modern antitrust era. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust,
127 U. PENN. L. REV. 1051 (1979). 
262. Experience gained from implementing greater speech protection in antitrust would
also inform the debate around adding other nonefficiency considerations to antitrust analysis.
263. See Matal v. Tam, 131 HARV. L. REV. 243, 247 (2017) (In Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744
(2017), “the Justices appear eager to define commercial speech narrowly, thus exposing more
regulations to strict scrutiny”). Justice Thomas is a particularly strong and long-standing
critic of the application applying a lesser protection, in the form of intermediate scrutiny, to
commercial speech. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“I do not see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting that
‘commercial’ speech is of ‘lower value’ than ‘noncommercial’ speech. Indeed, some historical
materials suggest to the contrary.”); see also Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring)
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could have important implications for antitrust. Most directly, it
could require speech-related remedies to be more tightly tailored
and, presumably, less effective at preventing future anticompetitive
outcomes.
CONCLUSION
The immunization of speech that would otherwise be condemned
by antitrust law underscores the value society places on free speech.
Yet, the current law, operating through the bookends of the speech
immunity defense and speech constraints on remedies, arguably
fails to give adequate attention to speech values. This failure can be
attributed, in part, to the difficulty of the problem.
Part I described the landscape of antitrust actions through a
speech lens. It revealed that speech is integral to a wide range of
anticompetitive conduct but that its direct recognition was essen-
tially limited to immunity and remedy questions. Significantly,
however, within liability assessments, speech often receives some de
facto protection for its contributions to efficiency. This is familiar
ground for antitrust analysis. What is unfamiliar is how to analyze
the nonefficiency aspects of speech (relating, for example, to
contributions to the marketplace of ideas) and antitrust law does
not try to do this.
It is much easier to point out the shortcomings of the current
approach than to solve them. Solving a defect in the law rarely
occurs in a Eureka moment, but occurs through a long path of
common law development. The directions of these paths are shaped
by the choices the courts make to grapple with the problems they
confront. When, for example, courts avoid the problem of dealing
with incommensurate values and tradeoffs by employing immunity
or no-immunity categorization of fact patterns, case law develop-
ment focuses on how to categorize fact patterns and circumvent
tradeoffs.264 When tradeoffs are routinely accepted, as with many
(“I continue to believe that when the government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to
suppress the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in
question may be characterized as ‘commercial.’”).
264. See supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
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“purely” antitrust matters,265 courts figure out ways to make them.
Thus, we think of development of a solution as a process of learning
in which interim choices should be valued not just in terms of their
impact today, but whether they facilitate learning needed to deliver
a better tomorrow.
Legal regime design problems, therefore, involve a number of
critical choices with attendant risks. How heavily should society
bias its decisions to avoid false positives or false negatives with
respect to protection of Constitutional issues? More specifically, how
much risk is society willing to tolerate to further protect speech
values in antitrust analysis? Should the speech rights of market
entities in the context of antitrust-related conduct be treated
differently than the speech rights of individuals? Could a first step
“tie-breaking” approach in antitrust liability analysis, that at least
allows for a transparent recognition of nonefficiency speech values,
lead to a better understanding of how a more nuanced approach
might work?
The stakes associated with this First Amendment-antitrust
challenge are increasing. This overlap is often found in sectors of the
economy that are both rapidly growing and evolving.266 Information
services markets such as an Internet search combine the potential
for anticompetitive conduct, conditions conducive to market power,
and a service whose nature arguably implicates speech values.267
The de facto protection given to efficiency-based speech values
through the application of the rule of reason in antitrust analysis268
is only a partial—though perhaps underappreciated—solution to
these problems. Unfortunately, this partial solution may have
suppressed the salience of the problem and contributed to a lack of
needed development of jurisprudence.
265. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
266. See supra notes 172-79.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 172-79.
268. See supra Part II.A.
